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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the theoretical and policy implications of contemporary American 
hegemony. A key argument of the paper is that the development of American hegemony 
generally, and the distinctive turn in American foreign policy that has occurred in the 
wake of September 11 in particular, can best be understood by placing  recent events in a 
comparative and historical framework. The immediate post-World War II order laid the 
foundation of a highly institutionalised multilateral system that provided key benefits for 
a number of countries whilst simultaneously constraining and enhancing American 
power. An historical reading of American hegemony suggests that its recent unilateralism 
is undermining the foundations of its power and influence. 
 
Introduction 
 
It is commonplace to describe the position of the United States in the contemporary 
international system as ‘hegemonic’, but does hegemony remain a useful concept in 
political science in the 21st century? When even The Economist routinely uses the 
term, it is clearly no longer an expression solely associated with scholarship, but one 
that seems to capture something fundamental about the nature of the early 21st century 
international order. And yet the current ‘hegemony of hegemony’ conceals as much as 
it reveals: the analytical purchase that the notion of hegemony once had is in danger 
of being dissipated through indiscriminate overuse, in much the same way that 
‘globalisation’ also become an over-used and under-specified cliché and hence not 
always a useful concept.  Confusion and imprecision emanates from the fact that 
hegemony is not static and US hegemony has evolved overtime since the Second 
World War.  It is thus the first aim of this essay to demonstrate that the development 
of American hegemony generally, and the distinctive turn in American foreign policy 
that has occurred in the wake of September 11 in particular, can best be understood by 
placing the more recent events in a comparative and historical framework. 
 Consequently, this paper is organised in the following manner.  First, we briefly 
revisit some of the more influential theories of hegemony.  We ask if the concept of 
hegemony needs to retain its original critical edge—and concomitant emphasis on the 
discursive-cum-ideological creation of social reality be found in international 
relations scholarship influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci—in order to offer 
useful analytical purchase.  For some, this is clearly the case. 1  Yet, notwithstanding 
the use of the term in US international relations as either a scholarly discipline 
(quintessentially in the work of Keohane, 1984) or perhaps more appropriately as in 
the study of US foreign policy, this radical hue is generally absent.   But from a policy 
perspective, the rejection of the utility of the concept in much US scholarship—even 
with its less critical applications in ‘hegemonic stability theory’—we shall argue, may 
help in part explain the recent failure to foresee some of the negative impacts of 
recent American policy in both the security and economic spheres.  Indeed, some of 
the most telling critical scholarly insights into recent American foreign policy have 
emerged from outside the United States (see for example, Buzan, 2004, Cox 2003, 
Hassner and Vaisse, 2003). 
 
The second part of the paper considers the creation, and early operation, of the 
international order that emerged in the aftermath of World War II.  In it we highlight 
the very different circumstances that prevailed when U.S. hegemony enjoyed more 
widespread support and international legitimacy—in the eyes of its allies, at least—
and the US was consequently able to sustain and benefit from its hegemonic position. 
Crucially, the immediate post-war order laid the foundation of a highly 
institutionalised multilateral system that provided key benefits for a number of 
countries whilst simultaneously constraining and enhancing American power.  Indeed, 
we see a commitment to institutionalism by the US—that is the building and 
underwriting the post world war two institutions—rather than multilateralism, as the 
more appropriate way to characterise US policy in that era. By so doing, the now 
clichéd distinction between a golden age of multilateralism and the new dark age of 
unilateralism, that pervades much populist critical literature of US policy, loses 
analytical, if not rhetorical, purchase; hence the title of this paper, ‘Hegemony, 
Institutionalism and US foreign Policy’.    
 
While the current order, considered in the final section of the paper and characterised 
by unilateralism, is different to the earlier era, it is not as different as a close reading 
of the history of post World War Two US foreign policy reveals.   There are, as we 
shall demonstrate, also key strands of continuity between the two eras.  Specifically, 
the key distinction is not between multilateralism and unilateralism rather it is 
between unilateralism and institutionalism. To make such an assertion is not, 
however, to suggest that the recent manner in which the US has tried to use its 
unparalleled power to secure compliance with an agenda that primarily reflects its 
priorities and interests—especially by its linkage of economic and strategic issues—is 
not unprecedented in the post-World War II period.    
 
Moreover, as we argue by way of conclusion, it is not impossible that the privileging 
of unilateralism over institutionalism may ultimately weaken the basis of the US 
hegemonic position. As events in Iraq demonstrate, and as the rise of anti-
Americanism around the world suggests more generally, there are limits to American 
power.  Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the historical record suggests that the 
U.S. is most powerful and able to pursue its narrowly conceived national interests 
when it is most engaged with, and responsive to, the institutional architecture of the 
international system of which it is such an integral part (Nye 2002; Beeson and Berger 
2003). One of the more important conclusions to emerge from the historically 
grounded comparative analysis that follows, therefore, is about the nature of 
hegemony itself.   Absent the constraining influence of a rival power with the desire 
and the apparent capacity to challenge American hegemony, and given the frequently 
uncritical support of key allies like Britain and Australia, hegemony may generate 
what, in the domain of international finance, economists call, a situation of ‘moral 
hazard’.  Moral hazard sees investors fund risky or unwise enterprises secure in the 
knowledge that should things go wrong it will be some other actor (host government 
or local investors) not they, that will carry the cost.  In the foreign policy version of 
moral hazard the hegemon is encouraged to undertake risky foreign policy initiatives 
in which, as with unsuccessful financial speculation, the principal speculator does not 
carry the major costs of failure and which, we shall argue by way of conclusion, may 
also undermine the longer-term primacy of the hegemonic power.  
 1. Recasting hegemony 
 
Before considering the ways the idea of hegemony has been used to describe the most 
dominant power of any era, it is worth saying something about our preference for this 
term, rather than the increasingly fashionable idea of ‘empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000; 
Bacevich 2002; Cox 2003). At the most general level there is still much merit in 
Adam Watson’s (1992: 15-16) distinction between empire as the ‘direct 
administration of different communities from an imperial centre’, and hegemony as 
the ability of some power or authority in a system to ‘lay down the law’ about 
external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them 
domestically independent. Although, there is clearly a debate to be had about the 
precise mechanisms though which such a broad distinction may be realised, and about 
the amount of independence that such a system might actually confer on various 
smaller powers, this sort of differentiation still has merit. Even if the recent attempt by 
the administration of George W. Bush to articulate and justify a ‘doctrine of pre-
emption’ (US Government, 2002) and its concomitant attempt to occupy and control 
Iraq is seen as an imperial impulse, it may prove to be an historical anomaly and one 
that may ultimately make similar future adventures less, rather than more likely. 
Indeed, the long-term consequence of the Iraq conflict may be a reversion to former 
patterns of less direct hegemonic control. 
 
The concept of hegemony has been employed in a number of different ways, but is 
always about the pre-eminent position of one power in and over the international 
system. Charles Kindleberger, who did more than anyone else to popularise the 
concept in the USA, is generally associated with a neo-realist position that culminated 
in the hegemonic stability theory so influential for much of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Central to Kindleberger’s (1973) analysis was the idea that the hegemonic power of 
the era could - indeed should, in America’s case – play a stabilising role in the 
international system (especially in the field of international finance) by providing 
collective goods and preventing the sort of economic cataclysm that occurred between 
the two world wars. Such assumptions about the necessity and potentially benign 
impact of hegemony provided the background for the elaboration of ‘hegemonic 
stability theory’, which claimed that ‘hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a 
single country are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes 
whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed’ (Keohane 1980: 132).  
 
The prominent position of hegemonic stability theory was largely undermined by the 
apparent decline of American power - something that led to a new concern about 
international stability ‘after hegemony’ (Keohane 1984) - and by the U.S.’s 
willingness to utilise its power in pursuit of primarily national goals rather than 
collective goods.  As is understood, expectations about American decline can be 
seriously premature (see, for example, Kennedy, 1987). Moreover, if the theoretical 
claims of hegemonic stability theory ever were valid they ought to be vindicated now, 
when American power is widely considered unipolar (Mastanduno 1997, Ikenberry, 
2002 and 2003). In such circumstances, hegemonic unipolarity might be expected to 
provide the potentially critical prerequisite for stability in a world of anarchy and 
relative gains (see Hobson 2000). Recent events, we will argue, have done little to 
confirm this expectation. 
 
The U.S.’s attempts to act unilaterally where key policymakers judge this to be in 
American interests suggest that while the current hegemon may enjoy historically 
unparalleled material advantages, the precise purposes to which such power may be 
put depends not on the unchanging structure of the international system, but on a 
complex interaction between domestic forces and shifting, contingent geo-political 
conditions. Crucial factors here, of course, are the foreign policymaking elites of 
particular eras. Some of the key figures in the post-war and post-9/11 periods will be 
considered in greater detail later, but it is worth emphasising at the outset that 
American foreign policy has always been characterised by a number of distinct, 
competing policy traditions that have powerfully shaped external relations. Walter 
Mead (2001) identifies four distinct traditions of American foreign policy – 
Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jefforsonians and Jacksonians.   
 
Elements of all these traditions can be detected in both periods under review here, 
with a clear distinction emerging between a Wilsonian-inspired concern about 
America’s moral obligation to create an international, rule-governed community 
prevailing after World War II, and the more Jacksonian preoccupation (albeit 
accompanied by Wilsonian rhetorical flourish) with domestic security, economic 
development and indeed, a kind of reactionary Jacksonian nationalism (with its 
emphasis on closed communities defined by race, ethnicity and religion) taking 
precedence under the current Bush administration.    Following a recent study by 
Anatole Lieven (2004a and b) we can now see that nationalism, not the usual lens 
through which to observe US foreign policy, is in fact a much stronger and little 
understood factor underwriting its behaviour in the contemporary era.  So powerful is 
it that it actually competes with, indeed seems to over rule, the Wilsonian liberal 
reading of hegemony in US foreign policy. As Leiven noted: 
 
‘One way of looking at American nationalism, and America’s troubled 
relationship with the contemporary world is to understand that many 
Americans are in revolt against the world which America has made.  … 
American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even 
rational version of American imperialism; that is to say, with the interests of 
the US as world hegemon.’ (Leiven, 2004a: 30) 
 
The point we are making here is that the roots of contemporary American foreign 
policy are national.  Indeed, policy has always been mediated by American domestic 
interests and priorities, rather than simply reflecting the logic of the international 
system itself. In other words, as Ruggie famously observed about the U.S.’s emerging 
dominance, ‘it was the fact of an American hegemony that was decisive after World 
War II, not merely American hegemony (Ruggie 1993: 593 [emphasis in original]). 
 
While it is important to acknowledge that scholars working in a traditional realist 
framework have some important insights to offer, especially given the current Bush 
administration’s desire and willingness to employ its material assets in pursuit of 
unilaterally defined goals, this sort of analysis cannot capture the complexity of either 
the domestic influences on foreign policy, or the wider international environment 
within which it unfolds. The focus on material power highlighted by Mearsheimer, for 
example, undervalues the importance of America’s ideational dominance—or ‘soft 
power’, that is emphasised by liberals like Nye (2002)—consequently leading him to 
conclude that ‘there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one 
anytime soon’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 41). While there are plainly limits to even the 
U.S.’s capacity to impose itself militarily, a preoccupation with material or strategic 
assets on the one hand or even soft power on the other, misses an important part of 
American dominance that flows from its institutionalised position at the centre of an 
increasingly ubiquitous, not to say ‘global’, liberal economic order (Ikenberry 2001; 
Latham 1997) reflecting what Mead (2004) has recently described as ‘sticky power. 
As we shall see, and despite the argument of critics who claim the post-war order that 
the U.S. effectively created was designed primarily to further the interests of 
American capital (Kolko, J&G 1972), the post-war order was widely accepted as 
functionally necessary and ideologically legitimate. 
 
Capturing this interplay of ideational, institutional and material forces that has 
effectively constituted American hegemony over the last fifty years or so is a plainly a 
complex task, but the influential model that draws its theoretical inspiration from 
Antonio Gramsci offers at least part of a potential answer. This approach is by now 
widely enough known to need little recapitulation here (see Germain and Kenny 
1998), but it is worth briefly highlighting some of its key features and potential 
advantages. One of the most useful aspects of the schema set out—now more than 
two decades ago by Robert Cox (1981)—was the attempt to link ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions, the interaction of which provides the basic structure of a 
given international order.  
 
This formulation produced a dynamic model of the international system, capable of 
capturing the evolving nature of hegemony, rather than the more static, state-centric 
conception, found in (neo) realist scholarship. The key advantage of this approach 
was that it helped to explain both the basis of American hegemony, its changing 
nature, and by implication, possible sources of decline. For as Cox (1987: 150) 
pointed out, one of the most important sources of ideational domination in the liberal 
market order American hegemony helped create and legitimise, was the separation of 
economics and politics; the rule-governed economic international order achieved an 
apparent independence that effectively insulated and entrenched the U.S’s overall 
position as the lynchpin of the system created in the early phase of American 
hegemony.  
 
This separation of economics and politics is complex, multifaceted and important to 
our story.  It gradually developed throughout the 20th century at both the level of 
scholarship (see Caporaso and Levine, 1992) and the level of policy practice, with the 
oft-made distinction between the ‘high politics’ of security and ‘low politics’ of trade.  
The scholarly development of economics, as a problem solving ‘science’ in the wake 
of the marginalist revolution on the one hand and the less theoretically robust, but 
nevertheless policy useful scholarship of international relations, offering us the linked 
notions of ‘anarchy’ and the balance of power on the other, suited the interest of the 
US national policy community wishing to maintain a distinction between high and 
low politics in the 20th century.  This situation largely prevailed until the end of the 
Cold War.    
 
But, what the marginalist revolution in economics had rent asunder at the end of the 
19th century, globalisation, at least in terms of policy, has brought together at the end 
of the 20th (for a discussion see Higgott, 1999 and 2002).  It is in the context of 
globalisation—defined here simply as a process of enhanced global economic 
integration via the progressive liberalisation of trade, deregulation of finance and 
privatisation of assets and hollowing out of state activities—that this distinction in 
both a scholarly and a policy sense is undermined.  It is in this context that the 
unilateral application of American power and the re-securitisation of U.S. economic 
foreign policy is to be understood.  To see why American hegemony may ultimately 
be undermined by its own recent actions, it is useful to contrast post 9/11 policies with 
the immediate post-war period, when a particular confluence of geo-political 
circumstances entrenched American dominance at the centre of the emerging 
international order. 
 
2. Present at the Creation: The Consolidation of American Power 
 
The parallels between the international system in the respective aftermaths of World 
War II and September 11 are striking indeed. The U.S. again finds itself engaged in a 
major reconstruction project involving massive sums of, mainly American, money in 
a fashion that is routinely compared to the Marshall Plan that began in 1947 (Dalton 
2003). Similarly, the current Bush administration has described itself as being in a 
‘war on terror’ that is eerily reminiscent of the struggle with communism that defined 
the earlier era. Yet while there are noteworthy parallels between the two periods, there 
are also important differences – differences which suggest that, despite the 
overwhelmingly dominant position of the U.S. in both periods, specific foreign policy 
initiatives, when combined with the dynamic interaction of material and institutional 
forces more generally, can produce distinctive outcomes that structurally-based 
readings of American power alone cannot easily account for. 
 
While World War II may have enhanced and revealed the extent of its primacy, the 
sheer fact of American dominance did not dictate policy. One of the most important 
influences on the thinking and actions of the policymakers who shaped the immediate 
post-war order—and something which is notably absent from the present 
generation—was a ‘preoccupation with the past’ (Gaddis 1972: 31). This is hardly 
surprising. Not only had the world emerged from the most destructive conflict ever 
seen, but the war itself had been preceded by an unprecedented economic crisis that 
had thrown millions out of work and into poverty, fuelled the rise of fascism, and 
raised major questions about the future of capitalism itself. Against such a backdrop, a 
desire to learn from history and avoid the mistakes of the past was understandable.  
 
What is more surprising is the precise form the American-led response to these earlier 
traumas took. Significantly, and again in distinction to the present situation, broadly 
conceived economic initiatives were largely separate from strategic concerns. This 
distinction should not be drawn too sharply because the successful economic 
reconstruction of Europe was plainly capable of serving a more encompassing geo-
political goal in the rapidly escalating struggle with communism.2 But not only is it 
possible to discern quite distinct influences and rationales for the strategic and 
economic components of America’s emerging post-war policy, there are also 
important internal influences on policy which meant that the very conception of 
national security was shaped by domestic forces and experiences (Smith 1994). It is 
possible to read unprecedented initiatives like the Marshall Plan as flowing directly 
out of America’s own experiments in economic stimulation under the New Deal 
(Hogan 1987). Indeed, it is important to remember that the New Deal itself was ‘the 
first wholly secular reform movement in American history’ (McDougall 1997: 149), 
and emblematic of the extensive internal transformation that the long twentieth 
century was working on the U.S. itself. Significantly, America’s post-war planners 
‘sought to project these principles onto the world as a macrocosm of the New Deal 
regulatory state (Burley 1993: 125).  In other words, without a major internal 
reorientation of American attitudes about the possible role of government and 
appropriate responses to wider geopolitical events, a very different form of hegemony 
might have developed. 
 
As it was, the defining influence on post-war policy was, of course, the Cold War and 
the rapidly evolving, Manichean struggle with the Soviet Union. Here the parallels 
with current ‘war on terror’ are irresistible, especially given the sense of moral 
certitude that has pervaded both periods of American policy-making. And yet George 
Kennan’s (1997 [1947]) highly influential analysis of Soviet behaviour dealt with a 
potentially formidable opponent with a similarly global reach; contemporary events 
by contrast—less than a year past the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and despite some 
of the inflated rhetoric—are well understood to be of plainly of a different order of 
magnitude. Not only were American planners in the post-war period constrained by a 
credible rival, they were also inhibited by what – until recently, at least – had been a 
pronounced sense of anti-imperialism (Gaddis 1997: 38; Smith 1994: 143), and a 
notable caution about ‘open-ended’ foreign entanglements. 
 
Realists might claim that American responses to the emerging bi-polar order were a 
product of the structure of that order itself and the U.S.’s pivotal role within it, but the 
precise nature of American policy is still somewhat surprising. Certainly, the Truman 
doctrine’s uncompromising commitment to support ‘free people’ may have reflected 
Kennan’s hard-headed, realist analysis of the Soviet threat, but there was also a 
recognition of the need for widespread aid to support European reconstruction ‘for the 
more urgent purpose of alleviating social and economic conditions which might breed 
communism’ (Gaddis 1972: 317). Belatedly, a recognition of the complex causes of 
security threats is now becoming part of the ‘war on terror’, but it is important to 
recognise that, in the aftermath of World War II, American policy was part of a more 
broadly-based effort to create an inter-locking, multilateral institutional structure with 
which to facilitate not just European re-construction, but also the international 
integration of economic and political activity more generally. True, America may 
have been the prime mover in the emerging order and arguably its principal 
beneficiary, but as Ikenberry (2001) notes, it was an order that not only offered pay-
offs for allies, but one that provided potentially important, institutionalised constraints 
on the U.S. and the unilateral application of its power. 
 The story of the development of the key institutions that emerged in the post-war 
period has been told elsewhere and is well-enough known to need little recapitulation 
here.3 One point, however, is worth emphasising. The scope of US ambition for the 
institutional architecture, that it did so much to create, should not be underestimated.  
In fact our preferred way of describing US policy during the Cold War era is as 
primarily ‘institutionalist’ rather than ‘multilateralist’.  While it took the lead in 
building multilateral institutions, including alliance structures such as NATO as well 
as the Bretton Woods economic institutions, the injunction to behave multilaterally 
always applied more to the junior partners in these organisations than the hegemon 
itself.  Indeed, a hallmark of US hegemony in this period was the development of 
institutions binding on others, but in which the hegemon was effectively only ever 
‘self-binding’ (Martin, 2003).   Thus the Bretton Woods system reflected what 
Ikenberry (2003) called an institutional bargain.  This bargain, underwritten by a 
combination of US power and resources, enlightened self-interest and liberal values, 
albeit it leavened by a dose of technocratic Keynesianism  (Ikenberry, 1993) allowed 
the creation of a set of collective goods providing institutions acceptable to both the 
US and its Cold War allies.   
 
As we will suggest, this bargain has come undone since the end of the Cold War as 
American administrations have progressively sought to free themselves from these 
institutionalised constraints and, in the process seemingly weakened the foundations 
of the post-war international order that American power helped create, and which 
largely reflected American goals and interests. Indeed, the persuasive arguments of 
the likes of Ikenberry notwithstanding, even an apparently selfless and multilaterally-
based initiative like the Marshall Plan was always tightly controlled by the US, 
furthered American grand strategy, and was essentially ‘unilateralism in the clothing 
of multilateralism’ (Kunz 1997: 33).4 The implication of this experience, and one that 
seems to have largely escaped the current generation of policymakers in the U.S., is 
that hegemonic power can be effectively—perhaps more effectively—exercised 
through multilateral auspices. 
 
The impact of American policy in the post-war period is that it had differential 
impacts that reflected the complex interplay of the contingent, the institutional and the 
ideational. As Maier (1981) pointed out, America’s successful intervention in post-
war Europe was made possible by a fundamental transformation in domestic class 
attitudes across much of the continent: European social structures were consequently 
more accommodating of American intrusion and receptive to the perceived necessity 
of national reconstruction. In addition, the fact that Americans were facilitating a 
process of re-construction, rather than attempting to impose an alien economic order 
obviously helps account for the success of the European experience; perhaps even 
more so that of Japan (Tabb 1995).  But American attitudes toward Asia also remind 
us that the impact of American hegemony was not a universal reflection of its 
structurally embedded position, but one that reflected contingent historical and 
cultural attitudes. As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 575) point out, the distinctive 
bilateral security architecture that emerged in East Asia reflected American attitudes 
that saw potential Asian allies as ‘part of an alien, and in important ways, inferior 
community’. Europeans, by contrast, were seen as potential equals – something that 
was reflected in the multilateral basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 
But if American power had differential regional impacts in the aftermath of World 
War II, this should not blind us to the further ambition of the institutional architecture 
it helped create. One of the most important differences between this earlier period and 
the present is the relationship between the economic and strategic arms of American 
foreign policy. As we shall see, the current administration is self-consciously linking 
these elements to achieve short-term policy objectives. In the earlier period, by 
contrast, and despite the encompassing brief of the Bretton Woods institutions,5 which 
were designed to encourage and manage international economic integration, a degree 
of national policy-making autonomy was built into the system (Ruggie 1982). Indeed, 
American policymakers were willing to tolerate different forms of economic 
organisation and political practices at a time when the central geopolitical 
preoccupation was the larger struggle with the Soviet Union (Berger 2003). 
 
In retrospect, therefore, American hegemony in the immediate post-war period is 
characterised by some significant continuities with, and differences from, the 
contemporary era. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was clearly a major 
material constraint on American freedom of action, but one which – somewhat 
fortuitously – provided the legitimating domestic rationale for an expansionary fiscal 
policy both at home and abroad (Kunz 1997: 331). Likewise, and despite the 
criticisms that the Bretton Woods institutions have subsequently received as a 
consequence of the evolution of their agendas (mission creep) beyond their initial 
remit (see, for example, Woods, 1999) they marked the institutional expression of the 
‘Big Idea’ that, according to Bacevich (2002: 88), has continued to inform American 
strategy: openness. Although Americans may not always have practised domestically 
what they preached abroad, the idea that America had a special historical mission to 
make the world a better place has been a continuing theme in American foreign 
policy, and one that was given direct expression in the Marshall Plan (McDougall 
1997: 209). Even if America’s post-war policy is seen as ultimately self-serving and 
part of a larger strategy to secure American interests and dominance, there is no doubt 
that initiatives like the Marshall Plan contributed not just to the reconstruction of 
Europe, but to the latter’s long-term political stability and integration (Hogan 1987: 
438).  
 
America’s European involvement may have been ‘by invitation’ (Lundstead 1986), 
and actually encouraged by the Europeans in a way that is sharply at odds with the 
situation in Iraq, but this only serves to highlight the importance—and 
unpredictability—of the interplay between contingent geopolitics, ideas and 
institutions. It was America’s ability to create an institutionalised, multilateral order to 
underpin its emerging hegemonic position that gave it a critical degree of legitimacy, 
and which enhanced the durability of the overall order of which it was a part. By 
contrast, at a moment when all agree American power is historically unrivalled, 
Hegemony, as we have defined it, is looking increasingly brittle. When seen in the 
light of this earlier experience, the reasons for the surprisingly fragile and paradoxical 
nature of American power in the contemporary period become more apparent. 
 
3.   The Securitisation of American Foreign Policy 
 
Global terror demands a global solution…America and our friends must 
move decisively to take advantage of these new opportunities. This is, 
then, a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded 
the number of free and democratic states…to create a new balance of 
power that favoured freedom (Rice 2002: 3). 
 The parallels with the post-war period are in some ways as striking as Condoleezza 
Rice’s remarks suggest. The attacks of September 11 did indeed provide what 
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described as ‘the kind of opportunities that 
World War II offered to refashion the world’.6 Significantly, however, the current 
Bush administration’s attempts to refashion the international order would be in line 
with a blueprint that significantly pre-dated the events of 9/11. The new vision for the 
post-S11 order had, in fact, been outlined while Bush was still on the campaign trail. 
As Daalder and Lindsay (2003: 13) note, ‘What September 11 provided was the 
rationale and the opportunity to carry out his revolution’.  While some of the rhetoric 
of the proposed new order may have been replete with the familiar staples of 
American foreign policy - a commitment to liberty and the promotion of democracy – 
the substance is radically different from earlier periods and predicated on a unilateral 
application of American power, a self-conscious linking of formerly discrete strategic 
and economic issues, and the general securitisation of foreign policy. 
 
Foreign economic policy under Bush has come to be articulated in the language of 
security.  Consequently, the distinction between high politics and low politics is 
disappearing.   The audience for this re-articulation, namely the USA’s international 
economic partners, is made aware of the salience of the now inseparable relationship 
between two domains of policy that were discursively, if not always practically, 
discrete for much of the 20th century.  There is an accompanying expectation that 
allies respond accordingly. The aim of securitisation is thus to justify the imposition 
of conditions and measures in the area of foreign economic policy that would not be 
considered the norm in this policy domain. 7  Economic globalisation is now seen not 
simply in neo-liberal economic terms, but also through the lenses of the national 
security agenda of the United States.  Consequently, economic globalisation is seen 
not only as a benefit, but also as a ‘security problem’.   
 
The events of 9/11 offered the opportunity for a group of what some call 
‘unilateralist-idealists’ (Hassner and Vaisse, 2003), some call the ‘new sovereigntists 
(Spiro, 2000), some call the ‘new exceptionalists (Hoffmann, 2003) or others call 
(William Pfaff, 2003: 10) call the ‘Washington Utopians’ in the Bush Administration, 
to set in train their project for a new approach to American foreign policy. 9/11 
provided the unilateralist idealists (epitomised in the New American Century Project, 
see http://www.newamericancentury.org) a launching pad for an agenda that might be 
described as a post sovereign approach (see Skidelsky, 2003) to American foreign 
policy. A key element of this process is the privileging of security in the economics-
security nexus or what—for heuristic purposes and borrowing liberally from the 
Copenhagen School (see Waever 1995)—we have chosen to call the ‘securitisation of 
economic globalisation’. 
 
While much of this is understood in the context of US security policy proper, perhaps 
less well articulated are the contours of this unilateralist urge in the wider reaches of 
US foreign policy and the way they have changed US attitudes towards economic 
globalisation.  The securitisation of globalisation means that US policy towards 
broader issues in the global economy is being subjugated to the imperatives of the 
security agenda.  As perhaps the most articulate foreign policy spokesmen for the 
Bush Administration has noted ‘ … globalisation is not just economic.  It is also a 
political and security phenomenon … we cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the 
violation of human rights in other countries if we want to be secure’ (Tony Blair, cited 
in Skidelsky, 2003: 32).  The new doctrine redefines and does away with the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.   
 
This move is historically unprecedented and theoretically challenging. In essence, 
both the scholarly literature and the empirical historical evidence suggest that multi-
polarity creates incentives for economic integration and cooperation between allies as 
well as enhancing economic interaction as a major instrument of cooperative 
statecraft.  By contrast, as we have suggested, the sort of bi-polarity that prevailed 
during the Cold War era encouraged the separation of economics and politics.  The 
analysis of uni-polarity is less well defined.  While resisting the structural realist 
assumptions about the independence of state power as an analytical variable in 
international relations, the experience of the early 21st century seems to confirm 
Michael Mastanduno’s (1998: 827) argument that a uni-polar structure will see the 
hegemonic state organise economic policy and practice ‘ …  to line up behind and 
reinforce its national security strategy’.  
 
In short, there would appear to be a correlation between the degree of dominance of 
the international system by the US in military terms, and the manner in which it uses 
economic policy as an arm of security policy. An empirical reading of US policy in 
the contemporary era shows how a uni-polar moment—in the domains of both trade 
and finance and at both multilateral and bilateral levels of policy-making, has tempted 
the hegemon to integrate economic and security policy more closely than under 
conditions of multi-polarity.  It has done so in a manner in which economic policy has 
become an arm of security policy.  US Economic policy—the details of which cannot 
be discussed here (but see Higgott, 2004a and 2004b)—rather than being a mere 
instrument of economic relations and statecraft has become a part of the armoury of 
influence that the US uses to develop a strategy towards potential challengers  
 
When seen as part of a wider context, contemporary US policy, especially the 
doctrine of pre-emption, challenges the bedrock theoretical assumptions (as opposed 
to historical and practical applications) of sovereignty as we have known them for 
much of the post-Westphalian era—sovereignty as the centre of authority, the origin 
of law and the source of individual and collective security within designated 
boundaries that distinguished the domesticated interior from the anarchical exterior.  
As is now well known, the essence of the doctrine of pre-emption was outlined in the 
National Security Strategy (US Government 2002: 15), which declared that the U.S. 
reserved the right to act pre-emptively to ‘forestall or prevent attacks by our enemies’. 
Given the open-ended nature of such threats and President Bush’s (2002) claim that 
America has a moral duty to ‘take the battle to the enemy’, the implications for the 
sovereign independence of those states the U.S. associates with terrorist activities is 
profound. 
 
This is not to suggest that sovereignty has previously been an absolute, manageable 
and uncontested concept, or that sovereignty could ever be equated with an equal 
form of independence for all states in anything other than the most narrow of legal 
interpretations (Jackson 1990; Beeson 2003a).  Neither does it deny that substantial 
inroads have been made into the capacity of states to make autonomous economic 
policy.  Clearly, the power of markets under conditions of global liberalisation, 
deregulation, privatisation and hollowing out of government has grown at the expense 
of the authority of states. Sovereignty has always been a relative, relational and, 
indeed, hypocritical concept.  But even a sceptic such as Stephen Krasner noted in the 
subtitle of his book on Sovereignty, that it was at least Organised Hypocrisy (Krasner, 
1999; but see also Walker, 1993 and Spruyt, 1994) that gave us some rules around 
which to organise the development of inter-state relations and create a system of 
norms, principles, rules and institutions above and beyond, or ‘outside’ the state.   
 
The point to emphasise here is that at the outset of his administration, the more radical 
post-sovereign liberal order envisaged by the Bush Administration was to be under 
written by American military power, and not by the collective approval of a wider 
liberal community.  As the National Security Strategy made clear, ‘[w]hile the United 
States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we 
will not hesitate to act alone…’ (US Government 2002: 6).  As Rhodes (2003: 136) 
notes, ‘America’s sovereign responsibilities supersede its commitment to international 
institutions’.  This is of course not a new assertion.  While the US has a history of 
pragmatic involvement in the development of specific international institutions, there 
has always been a sub-conscious ambivalence in the US attitudes towards 
multilateralism across the historical period under review in this paper.   
 
In making this assertion, we must be clear what we mean by multilateralism.  In the 
theoretical literature, multilateralism, relates to the management of trans-national 
problems with three or more parties but operating with a series of acceptable ‘ … 
generalized principles of conduct’ (Ruggie, 1993: 11).  That is, the principles of 
behaviour should take precedence over interests.  But we need to distinguish between 
multilaterlism as a principled institutional form of behaviour in international relations 
(Ruggie, 1993: 8) on the one hand and the actual development and operation of 
formal international organisations, as the centre-piece of multilateralism as policy 
practice, on the other.   
 
Overtime, the precedence of principle over interest should lead to collective trust 
within an institution, amongst players of many different strengths and sizes. A key 
element in the development of this sense of trust would be a feeling amongst the 
smaller players that the major actors, especially an erstwhile hegemon, would be 
willing to accept Martin’s principle of ‘self-binding’.  As we have tried to suggest, the 
comparative historical narrative of the role of the US in the second half of the 20th 
century, and especially in the development of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
demonstrated a US willingness to be ‘self-bound’ in a way that is not apparent in the 
contemporary era.8  
 
But the distinction between multilatreralism as a principled form of behaviour and 
multilateralism as the conduct of foreign policy through international institutions is 
often confused in practice.  For many observers of US foreign policy, the use of 
multilateral institutions is believed to be but one policy option among many, rather 
than driven by any sense of obligation to operate in this manner.  US policy had 
always been either ‘instrumental multilateralism’ (Foot et al, 2003) or ‘ambivalent 
engagement’ (Stewart and Forman, 2002) driven by an understanding of US 
‘exceptionalism’ (Luck, 2003). 
 
It is in this context that the language of the unilateralist that has prevailed in the early 
21st century must be located.  Multilateralism, be it what we might call the practical 
realist multilateralism of a Henry Kissinger (2001) or the principled idealist 
multilateralism of a Joseph Nye (2002), is seen by its opponents as a check on 
American interests and action.  To understand why, we must appreciate not only the 
ideological objections reflecting the resistance to global cooperation inherent in the 
increasingly nationalist underpinnings of US foreign policy identified earlier in the 
work of Leiven (2004a and b).  We must also note that a key element in the 
contemporary theory and practice of global governance—the evolution of global 
networks at the expense of international hierarchies—is not welcomed in 
Washington.   
 
Networks pursue their activities (such as waging unconventional war on states) by 
using systems of sprawling, horizontally interconnected, networks of private power 
and authority (Rosenau, 2002, Hall and Biersteker, 2002.) Notwithstanding US 
military and economic preponderance, the changing structures of authority—or more 
accurately power—reflected in the growing salience of network governance under 
conditions of globalisation sit badly with contemporary thinking and practice in US 
foreign policy.  Administrations in Washington, be they Democratic or Republican, 
have not adjusted well to ‘discursive’, networked or internet-led conference style 
diplomacy that appears to empower non-state actors at the expense of diminished state 
control over the policy process (see Wedgwood, 2000: 35-40).   
 
Reconciling state-focussed US security instincts with these new networked based 
patterns of activity—influenced not only by states, but non-state actors, trans-national 
forces and new kinds of threats—as the evidence of the 21st century suggests, is 
proving harder for US Governments to come to terms with.  The blurring of the 
borders between what is domestic and what is international in the policy process has 
challenged traditional US understandings of national interest.  This is especially so in 
those policy domains where trans-national decision-making—for example, on issues 
such as the environment and climate change (cf. US attitudes towards the Kyoto 
protocol) or the application of international law (cf. US attitudes towards the ICC)—
clashes with US domestic law or runs up against a US conception of national security.  
 
Multilateralism for large sections of the US policy community, at best, implies the 
opportunity for others to free ride on the US’s material support.  At worst, it implies 
sovereignty dilution and unwanted entanglements.  This is not simply to argue that the 
US has repudiated multilateralism as a principled institutional form of governance in 
its entirety.  Rather, the US has become more instrumental in its choice of issue areas 
in which it will adopt a multilateral approach as a matter of preferred policy practice.  
It has adopted a ‘pick and mix’ approach.  As can be seen from its efforts to establish 
a post-Saddam order in Iraq it will accept ‘legitimating’ and burden sharing 
multilateral engagements provided they suit its preferred policy positions and do not 
constrain its ability for manoeuvre.   
 
But clearly, the unilateralist discourse—in which the US expressed fears that the 
burden of consensus building might constrain it from acting freely in the pursuit of its 
stated ideals of promoting democracy, human rights and free trade—has been in the 
ascendancy in the 21st century and has found its fullest articulation in contemporary 
US policy in Iraq  (see Dodge 2003).  But the removal of Saddam Hussein has been 
but one episode, theoretically at least, in a wider agenda for a world the US ‘seeks to 
create’ and the manner in which it proposes to undertake this task (Rhodes, 2003: 
132).   
 
Unilateral action, backed by American military power, is the modus operandi to be 
adopted.  We do not yet know the degree to which US staying power will back up this 
rhetoric.  But failing to live up to expectations will only reinforce that already strong 
stream of cynicism that greets American motives in many parts of world opinion (see 
Prestowitz, 2003:1-14).  In short, while the rhetoric of the early 21st century has been 
idealist, we have yet to see whether the practice will confirm this principle, or whether 
the realist instinct to privilege the US interest in the international system without 
actually changing the system will re-occur as it has done in times in past.  
 
Thus, stripped of its essentials, the purpose of current American strategy seems to be 
the use of its military, technical, and what it believes to be its moral, superiority to 
advance a very specific view of liberalism and freedom.  The simple and universal 
view of freedom espoused by the neo-conservative idealists currently driving US 
foreign policy is rarely reflected in political practice.  Moreover, the ideas of 
liberalism and freedom found in large pockets of the American right is alien to that 
which exists in many of the world’s other developed democracies, and indeed also 
within significant streams of political thinking within the United States (see Foner, 
1998 and Richardson, 2001).   
 
Contrary to the manner in which ideas of liberalism and freedom are articulated by the 
neo-conservatives within the Bush Administration, these are contested concepts and 
not universal truths.  The Bush view of liberalism assumes that it has universalist 
properties, and does so at the very time when many traditionally significant 
proponents of liberalism are abandoning this conceit.  (For a discussion see 
Richardson, 2002, 3).  The Bush view has, to-date, taken no account of the fact that 
liberal norms embedded in the political cultures of many Western societies might not 
be similarly suited to societies with different philosophical and cultural 
underpinnings. In essence, the view of liberal freedom emanating from the 
contemporary neo-conservative community in the US is what Richardson calls ‘a 
single value concept of liberalism’.  It is this that sets it apart from more traditional 
and moderate and pluralist understanding of the concept (Richardson, 2002: 8-9).  The 
Bush view appears to represent a strange mix of Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) negative and 
positive views of liberty, with an emphasis on the right to the negative freedom to 
choose on the one hand, and accompanied by a positive requirement, for others at 
least, to accept certain prescribed moral truths on the other.  This is, at the very least, 
a self-contradictory theoretical position.   
 
Generalisations should not be made about US foreign policy purely on the basis a 
reading of the Bush era alone, especially regarding attitudes towards multilateral 
institutions.  As we have suggested, historical patterns present a more complex 
picture.  The relationship between US foreign policy and multilateralism has always 
been, ambivalent and instrumental (Stewart, 2002: 12-13 and Luck, 2003). Thus, any 
longer term prospects for a more cooperative and multilateral international order are 
not to be explained by traditional realist understandings of power balancing against a 
uni-polar order moving in the direction of a multi-polar order.  US allies, when their 
Cold War dependence on US power was manifest, may have readily acquiesced in the 
US ad hoc approach to multilateralism.  But things changed, and continue to change, 
in the post-Cold War era.   
 
It is not necessary to accede to Robert Kagan’s overdrawn suggestion that Americans 
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus (2003) to see sharp differences between 
continental European and American approach towards world politics in general and 
global institutional cooperation in particular.  The EU and the US differ on questions 
of ‘partnership’ burden sharing’, and ‘exceptionalism’ as well as approaches to global 
economic management (see Wallace 2002: 145-6).  For the Bush Administration, 
what drives contemporary world order is ‘primacy’ and freedom to manoeuvre. For 
Europeans (and, we might note, especially the UK before Tony Blair became 
entangled in the Bush project) it is ‘globalisation’ (Daalder, 2003: 151-53).  Europe, 
in theory if not always in practice, exhibits a stronger normative attitude towards 
multilateral governance structures than is to be found across the spectrum of the US 
policy community.  It is inconceivable, for example, that any US administration 
would prepare a document similar to The EU and the UN: The Choice of 
Multilateralism (Commission of the European Communities) that argues for a 
‘systematic integration of multilateral and bilateral policy objectives’ (their 
emphasis) (2003: 10).  Similarly, the EU disposition for multi-level-governance and 
‘sovereignty pooling’ is equally incomprehensible to US foreign policy makers.   
 
Without over-stating the case, similar distinctions may also be drawn from East Asia 
in the early 21st century.   It too, places a greater stress on multilateral and regional 
cooperation, although, as in Europe, there may be a marked disconnect between 
theory and rhetoric on the one hand and application and practice on the other.  But we 
live in an era of the ‘new regionalism’ in East Asia that has progressed apace since the 
financial crises of the latter part of the 1990s.  The key elements of the new 
regionalism have been enhanced regional economic dialogue and interaction both 
amongst the states of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and between 
these states and the states of Southeast Asia through the development of the ASEAN 
+ Three (or APT) process. To be sure, these regional cooperative dialogues remain 
rudimentary when contrasted with the level of integration to be found in Europe, but 
these dialogues have been spurred on by the perceived limitations of the multilateral 
system and the changing relationships of the major regional actors to the USA (see 
Beeson 2003b; Deiter and Higgott, 2003; Stubbs, 2002).   
 
In short, US Allies, especially the Europeans and, to a lesser extent the Asians, seem 
intent on creating an institutional order less dependent on American power, more 
dependent on rules and principles and in which the US is granted less prerogative and 
licence than in the past.  Their rhetoric is certainly different to that which emanates 
from the USA.  But so to is their practice as illustrated, for example, in the contrast 
between the increasingly systematic use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
by the EU and Asia on the one hand, and the across the board resistance (UN, ICC, 
Kyoto, Land mines etc) by the US to containment within multilateral institutions on 
the other. 
These differences having been noted, it behoves us to remember that the current 
historical rupture in thinking between Washington and other points of the global 
compass is so sharp that much of what was learned in the post-Cold War decade is in 
danger of being forgotten.  Prior to the rise to power of the neo-conservatives, it was 
possible to identify a (see Risse, 2002) high degree of trust and loyalty amongst the 
ruling trans-Atlantic policy communities.  Such was the degree of this trust that even 
serious conflicts (over trade, for example) did not threaten the ability of the wider 
structure of institutions and shared expectations to contain them.  It is because the 
ideological position and behaviour of the neo-conservatives is so far to the unilateral 
end of the curve that trust in the US to use of its power responsibly in what Risse calls 
a ‘liberal security community’ appears to be waning. 
 
Conclusion: Hegemony and Institutionalism in an Era of Ambiguity 
We live an era of ambiguity.  A number of important similarities and differences 
emerge from a comparison of America’s evolving hegemonic position now and in the 
aftermath of WWII which merit emphasis. But at the same time, we are in an era in 
which history offers us little by way of assured lesson learning.  While the U.S. was 
and is still plainly the most powerful country on the planet, its current position looks 
less assured than the, by now routine, comparisons with the Roman Empire might 
suggest. The U.S. is widely considered to have achieved a position of uni-polar 
dominance in an era in which it is confronted by no serious rival. Equally, market 
based capitalism as a form of economic organisation—notwithstanding differences of 
opinion about how best to manage it—is similarly unchallenged.   Yet, it is clearly not 
inappropriate to ask if we might have reached the high-water mark of American 
power? While not insensitive to many other previous premature efforts to signal the 
high water mark of US hegemony, let us consider this issue by way of conclusion. 
The invasion of Iraq highlights not only US power, but also many of America’s 
potential vulnerabilities. Crucially, the entire project relied on the efforts of a rather 
exclusive and narrowly-based ‘coalition of the willing’, which not only highlighted 
divisions between formerly staunch allies in North American and Western Europe, but 
which lacked the institutional imprimatur of the most important intergovernmental 
organisation of the era.  The UN’s failure to endorse the conflict meant that from the 
outset the U.S. lacked the sort of broadly based support and legitimacy that 
distinguished its position in the post-WWII period. When coupled with the practical 
difficulty of restoring order, let alone establishing democracy in Iraq, the appropriate 
historical comparison without overdrawing the analogy may rather be with Vietnam, 
than post-war European construction (Kolko 2003). 
More fundamentally, perhaps, the war highlights America’s economic vulnerabilities, 
too. The U.S.’s budgetary position had already been transformed under the Bush 
administration as a consequence of economically dubious, ideologically motivated tax 
cuts.  Lest we forget, the Vietnam War is a reminder of the way security issues can 
transform economic policy with profound, unexpected, long-term consequences for 
both the U.S. domestic economy and the international system more generally. The 
war in Iraq has made the fiscal position dramatically worse (The Economist 2003).  
For all it’s military might, the US remains reliant on other countries—especially in 
East Asia—to continue funding its debt and consumption patterns (Goodman 2003). 
 It is here that our moral hazard argument returns.  To-date, the US has been able to 
spend on overseas ventures reliant in the knowledge that others will share, indeed 
carry, most of the costs. The assumption, if never explicitly stated, has been that 
others would be unwilling to cease funding the debt because of the implications it has 
for the continued health of their own economies.  But things are changing.  In contrast 
to the first Gulf War—which thanks to the support of wealthy allies (notably Japan 
and Germany) was effectively revenue neutral for the US—the cost of the overthrow 
of Saddam has been borne more or less exclusively by the US.  In the first Gulf War, 
as Fred Bergsten noted, ‘collective leadership’ meant that America led and America 
collected (cited in Cooper et al, 1991: 439).  In the second Gulf War when it has come 
to the issues of bearing the financial costs of the war the US has been supported by a 
‘coalition of the unwilling’.   Similarly, there is a remarked reluctance on the part of 
major economies such as France and Germany to provide large amounts of financial, 
or indeed any other kind, of support as part of a post war rapprochement with the US.   
There are other example of growing unwillingness to   fall into line with US demands 
for economic adjustment to support US interests and policy preferences.  For 
example, China’s has exhibited a total disinterest in addressing its trade surplus with 
the US via a currency adjustment, notwithstanding considerable US pressure.  This 
can be contrasted with Japanese responses, in similar circumstances in the 1980s, 
when the Plaza and Louvre Accords saw major upward adjustments in the strength of 
the Yen .  
The contemporary era in US foreign policy stands in marked contrast with the earlier 
periods in other ways, in terms of both content and application.  As Lisa Martin 
(2003) has persuasively argued, the United States has effectively adopted an ad hoc 
approach towards multilateralism in particular.  The very idea that the dominant 
global power might need to act in a self-binding way has been forcefully disregarded 
over the early years of the 21st century.   For multilateralism—as an important 
institutional form of governance—to work, rules must bind, or at least appear to bind, 
the hegemon, as well as the smaller players.  Historically, especially in the immediate 
post World War II era, the US behaved in such a way, with an eye to the future.  2004 
might be seeing the Bush Administration stepping back from the harshest phase of its 
antipathy to multilateralism of 2002/3.  But, even given continued difficulties 
securing the post-war settlement in Iraq, it still resists the notion of investing in 
multilateralism as a set of principles and norms as opposed to but one potentially 
useful tool at its disposal with which to make foreign policy.   As Martin notes: 
‘Turning to multilateralism only under duress and when it appears 
convenient demonstrates a lack of commitment, even an implicit rejection 
of the principles of multilateralism.  … This hollows out the core of such 
organisations, as they no longer provide the self-binding function they 
once did. … Without the self-binding of the hegemon, multilateral 
organisations become empty shells (2003: 14). 
If we follow Martin’s logic, then even with a change of Administration, in 
Washington, the trust deficit that has been created is likely to remain for some time to 
come.  The reputation of multilateralism as a principal (and principled) institutional 
form of global governance in both the economic and, it goes without saying, the 
security domain in the early years of the 21st century, is badly damaged.  It will take 
time to tell whether this damage can be undone.  More generally, some scholars are 
beginning to ask, as indeed do we by implication in this paper, if the US may have 
been undermining the very basis of its own hegemonic position in the early 21st 
century.   According to John Ikenberry (2004: 20), for example, the ‘neo-
fundamentalist’ security policies of Bush Administration have ‘squandered America’s 
moral authority’ and led to dramatically wrong strategic thinking that has under-
minded US credibility, prestige, security relationships and goodwill; and done so to 
such an extent that it will take many years to undo.   
A change of heart in the US is not all that is required to undo this situation.  This is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition to (re) build positive structures of global 
economic governance and it is not axiomatic.  Any administration will be subject to 
pressures to respond to increasingly assertive domestic interests that—like US allies 
in the international domain—have been freed from the disciplines of the Cold War. 
Growing numbers of politically powerful domestic actors, resorting to increasingly 
nationalist rhetoric about what they see as the negative impact of globalisation on jobs 
and welfare, increasingly rail against the US accepting binding multilateral 
commitments or indeed undertaking other foreign policy initiatives in general. 
A hegemon, any hegemon, inevitably attracts enmity and resistance.  But an altruistic 
(Kindledberger, 1973) or a benign (Strange, 1987) US hegemony, capable of 
delivering global public goods, has clearly had, until recently, a longstanding degree 
of acceptance and implicit (if not overt) legitimacy, in large quarters of world opinion.  
The same cannot be said in the contemporary in which the US—in what many sees as 
an assertively nationalist projection of a narrowly conceived interest (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya’s ‘selfish hegemon’, 2003:13)—demonstrates little or no concern for 
problems other than those which affect it directly and in which the issue of the 
legitimacy of the hegemon’s behaviour ceases to be one of implicit acceptance and 
becomes on of explicit scrutiny.9  Notwithstanding the continuities and changes we 
have identified in US foreign policy over the period under review in this essay, this 
difference—between a relatively benign, albeit instrumental, hegemony underwritten 
by liberal principles and institutions on the one hand and a more selfish hegemony, 
underscored by a stronger Jacksonian nationalism, on the other—is the key difference 
between the two eras. 
 
References. 
 
Acheson, Dean (1969) Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 
(New York: W.W. Norton). 
 
Bacevich, Andrew J (2002) American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US 
Diplomacy, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press). 
 
Beeson, Mark (2003a) ‘Sovereignty under siege: Globalisation and the state in 
Southeast Asia’, Third World Quarterly, 24 (2): 357-374.  
Beeson, Mark (2003b) ‘ASEAN Plus Three and the rise of reactionary regionalism’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 (2): 251-68.  
 
Beeson, Mark (2003) ‘Australia’s relationship with the United States: The case for 
greater independence’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38 (3): 387-405. 
 
Beeson, Mark and Berger, Mark T. (2003) ‘The paradoxes of paramountcy: Regional 
rivalries and the dynamics of American hegemony in East Asia’, Global Change, 
Peace and Security, 15 (1): pp 27-42 
 
Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton (2001) ‘The Gordian Knot of Agency-
Structure in International Relations: A neo-Gramscian Perspective’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol.7/1: 5-35.  
 
------- (2003) ‘Neo-Gramscianische Perspektiven in den Internationalen 
Beziehungen‘, in Manuela Spindler and Siegfried Schieder (eds.) Theorien der 
Internationalen Beziehungen: Eine Einführung. Opladen: Leske+Budrich (UTB). 
PP.337-62.  
 
------- (2004) ‘A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical 
Change: neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations’, Capital & Class, 82: 
 
Berger, Mark T. (2003) The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization, 
(London: Routledge). 
 
Berlin, Isaiah (1969) Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Panagariya, Arvind (2003) ‘Bilateral Treaties are a Sham’, The 
Financial Times, 14 July, 13. 
 
Burley, Anne-Marie (1993) ‘Regulating the world: Multilateralism, international law, 
and the projection of the New Deal regulatory state’, in Ruggie, John Gerard (ed.), 
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional From, (New York: 
Columbia University Press): 125-56 
 Bush, George W. (2002) ‘Graduation speech’, Westpoint, New York, June 1, at:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html 
 
Buzan, Barry (2004) ‘American Exceptionalism, Unipolarity and September 11: 
Explaining the Behaviour of the Sole Superpower’, Montreal, ISA, 2004 
 
Caporaso, James and Levine, David (1992) Comparative Political Economy, New 
York: Cambridge University press. 
 
Clark, Ian (2004) ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’ Review of International Studies, 29: 
75-96. 
 
 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003) The European Union and the 
United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism, Brussels, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the Parliament, September 10, COM 526 final. 
 
Cooper, Andrew F, Higgott, Richard Andrew and Nossal, Kim Richard (1991) 
‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’, Political 
Science Quarterly, 106 (3): 395-410. 
 
Cox, Michael (2003) ‘The empire’s back in town: Of America’s imperial temptation – 
again’, Millennium, 32 (1): 1-27. 
 
Cox, Robert W. (1981) ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international 
relations theory’, Millennium, 10 (2): 126-55. 
 
------- (1987) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of 
History, (New York: Columbia University Press). 
 
Crispin, Shawn W. (2003) ‘Falling in step’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 June: 
19. 
 Daalder, Ivo (2003) ‘The End of Atlanticism’, Survival, 45 (2): 142-66. 
 
------- and Lindsay, James M. (2003) America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in 
Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution). 
 
Dalton, Rodney (2003) ‘We’ll never run away, vows Bush’, The Australian, 
November 5th: 8. 
 
Deiter, Heribert and Richard Higgott (2003) ‘Exploring Alternative Theories of 
Economic Regionalism: From Trade to Finance in Asian Co-operation’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 10 (3) 2003: 430-54. 
 
Dodge, Toby (2003)’US interventions and possible Iraqi futures’, Survival, 45 (3): 
103-22. 
 
Eichengreen, B. and Kenen, P.B. (1994) ‘Managing the world economy under the 
Bretton Woods ssytem: An overview’, in Kenen, P.B. (ed.), Managing the World 
Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods, (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics): 3-80. 
 
Foner, Eric (1998) The Story of American Freedom, (New York: W.W. Norton). 
 
Foot, Rosemary, MacFarlane, Neil and Mastanduno, Michael, (2003) ‘Instrumental 
Unilateralism in US Foreign Policy’ in Foot et. al, (eds) US Hegemony and 
International Organisations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 
 
Hall, Rodney Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas J. (2002) (eds.) The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
Hassner, Pierre and Vaisse, Justin (2003) Washington et le Monde: Dilemmes d’un 
Superpuissance, Paris: CERI/Autrement. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000), Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press). 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis (1972) The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-
1947, (New York: Columbia University Press). 
 
------- (1997) We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Germain, Randall D. and Kenny, Michael (1998) ‘Engaging Gramsci: Intentional 
relations theory and the new Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, 24: 3-21. 
 
Gill, Stephen (1993) (ed) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International 
Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Goodman, Peter S. (2003) ‘U.S. debt to Asia swelling’, Washington Post, September 
13: E01. 
 
Hemmer, Christopher and Katzenstein, Peter J (2002) ‘Why is there no NATO in 
Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism’, 
International Organization, 56 (3): 575-607. 
 
Higgott, Richard, (1999) ‘Economics, Politics and International Political Economy: 
The Need for A Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalisation’, New Political Economy, 4 
(1): 23-36. 
 
-------- (2002)  ‘Taming Economics, Emboldening International Relations: The 
Theory and Practice of International Political Economy in an Era of Globalisation’, in 
Stephanie Lawson (ed) The New Agenda for International Relations, Cambridge: 
Polity. 
 
------- (2004a) ‘US Foreign Economic Policy and the Securitisation of Globalisation’, 
International Politics 41, Summer, 2004, in press. 
 
------- (2004b) ‘After Neo-Liberal Globalisation: The ‘Securitisation’ of US Foreign 
Economic Policy in East Asia’, Development and Change, forthcoming. 
 
------- (2004c) Multilateral Economic Institutions and the Limits to Global 
Governance, Paper prepared for Task Force on Global Governance of the 
International Institute for Administrative Sciences, New York:  IIAS, March 29, 
 
Hobson, John M. (2000) The State and International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Hoffmann, Stanley (2003) American Exceptionalism: The New Version, Harvard 
University: Weatherhead Centre for Science and International Affairs, 1-17. 
 
Hogan, Michael J. (1987) The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the 
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
 
Ikenberry, G. John,. (1992) ‘A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the 
Post War Anglo-American Settlement’, International Organisation, 46 (1): 289-321. 
 
------- (2001) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars, (Princeton University Press). 
 
-------  (2003) ‘State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America’s Ambivalent 
Economic and Security Multilateralism’, in Foot, Rosemary, MacFarlane, Neil and 
Mastanduno, Michael, (2003) ‘Instrumental Unilateralism in US Foreign Policy’ in 
Foot et. al, (eds) US Hegemony and International Organisations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 
 
------- (2004) ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’, Survival, 46 (1): 7-22. 
 
Kagan, Robert (2003) Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New 
World Order, New York: Knopf. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1980) ‘The theory of hegemonic stability and changes in 
international economic regimes, 1967-1977’, in Holsti, O., Siverson, R. and George, 
A. (eds.), Change in the International System, (Westview Press): 131-62. 
 
------- (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Kennan, George (1997 [1947]) ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, in Hoge, James F. 
and Zakaria, Fareed (eds.), The American Encounter: The United States and the 
making of the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books): 155-69. 
 
Kennedy, Paul (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict, 1500-2000, New York Random House 
 
Kindleberger, Charles P.  (1973) The World in Depression, 1929-1939,  (London : 
Allen Lane). 
 
Kissinger, Henry (2001) Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Towards a New 
Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Kolko, Joyce and Kolko, Gabriel (1972) The Limits to Power: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, (New York: Harper & Row). 
 
Kolko, Gabriel (2003) ‘The perils of Pax Americana’, The Australian, January 13: 9. 
 
Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Kunz, Diane B. (1997) Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, 
(New York: Free Press). 
 
Latham, Robert (1997) The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of 
Postwar International Order, (New York: Columbia University Press). 
 
Leiven, Anatole, (2004b) ‘Demon in the Cellar’, Propsect, March 2004, 28-33. 
 
------- (2004b) The Demon in the Cellar: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, New 
York: Harper Collins, 2004 
 
Lowi, Theodore (1979) The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United 
States, New York: Norton. 2nd Edition. 
 
Luck, Edward (2003) ‘American exceptionalism and international organizations: 
Lessons from the 1990s’, In Foot, R., MacFarlane, N. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), US 
Hegemony and the International Organization, (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 
25-48. 
 
Lundestad, Geir (1986) ‘Empire by invitation? The United States and Western 
Europe, 1945-1952’, Journal of Peace Research, 23 (3): 263-77. 
 
Maier, Charles S (1981) ‘The two postwar eras and the conditions for stability in 
twentieth-century Western Europe’, American Historical Review, 86 (2): 327-52. 
 
Martin, Lisa (2004) Multilateral Organisations after the US-Iraq War of 2003, 
Harvard University, Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, August: 1-17 
 
Mastanduno, Michael  (1997) ‘Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and 
US grand strategy after the Cold War’, International Security, 21 (4): 49-88. 
 
— (1998) ‘Economics and security statecraft and scholarship’, International 
Organization, 52 (4): 825-54. 
 
McDougall, Walter A. (1997) Promised Land, Crusader State: The American 
Encounter With the World Since 1776, (Boston: Mariner Books). 
 
Mead, Walter R. (2001) Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It 
Changed the World, (New York: Alfred Knopf). 
 
------- (2004) ‘America’s Sticky Power’, Foreign Policy, March-April, 46-53 
 
Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. 
Norton). 
 
Milward, Alan S (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, (Berkely: 
University of California Press). 
 
Nye, Joseph (2002) The Paradox of American Power, (Oxford University Press). 
Patrick, Stewart and Shephard Forman (2002) (eds) Multilateralism and US Foerign 
Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner). 
 
Pfaff, William (2003) ‘The philosophers of chaos reap the whirlwind’, International 
Herald Tribune, August 10: 23-4. 
 
Prestowitz, Clyde (2003) Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of 
Good Intentions, (New York: Basic Books). 
 
Rice, Condoleezza (2002) ‘Remarks on Terrorism and Foreign Policy’, John Hopkins 
University, April 29. At: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04. 
 
Rhodes, E (2003) ‘The imperial logic of Bush’s liberal agenda’, Survival, 45 (1): 131-
54. 
 
Richardson, James L. (2001) Contending Theories of Liberalism in World Politics: 
Ideology and Power, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner). 
 
— (2002) ‘Critical liberalism in International Relations’, Working Paper, 2002/7, 
Canberra: Australian national University). 
Risse, Thomas (2002) ‘US Power in a Liberal Security Community’, in John G 
Ikenberry, (ed) America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
 Rosenau, James N (2002) ‘Governance in the New Global Order’, in David Held and 
Anthony McGrew (eds) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Rupert, Mark (2003) Globalising Common Sense: A Marxian/Gramscian (re)-vision 
of the politics of governance/resistance’, Review of International Studies, 29: 181-98 
 
Ruggie, J.G. (1982) ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded 
liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization, 36 (2): 379-
415. 
 
------- (1993) ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution’, in Ruggie, (ed) 
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Skidelsky, Robert (2003) ‘The American contract’, Prospect, July: 30-35. 
 
Smith, Tony (1994) America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide 
Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press). 
 
Spiro, Peter (2000) ‘The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False 
Prophets’, Foreign Affairs, 79 (6): 9-15. 
 
Spruyt, Hendrik (1994) The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
 
Stewart, Patrick (2002) ‘Multilateralism and its Discontents: The Causes and 
Consequences of US Ambivalence’, in Patrick Stewart and Shepard Forman, (eds) 
Multilateralism in US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, Boulder, CO: Lynn 
Reinner. 
 
Strange, Susan (1987) ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’, International 
Organisation, 41 (4): 551-74 
 
Stubbs, Richard (2002) ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’ 
Asian Survey, 44 (2): 440-455. 
 
Tabb, William K (1995) The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and 
Economic Transformation, (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
The Economist (2002) A survey of America’s world role’, June 29th, 2002. 
 
— (2003) ‘A flood or red ink’, November 8: 24-26. 
 
US Government (2002) National Security Strategy of the USA,  (Washington: The 
Whitehouse). 
 
Waever, Ole (1995) ‘Securitsation and desecuritisation’, in Lipschutz, R.D. (ed.), On 
Security, (New York: Columbia University Press): ?? 
 
10Walker, R.B.J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Wallace, William (2002) ‘US Unilateralism: A European Perspective’, in Patrick, 
Stewart and Shephard Forman, (eds) Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: 
Ambivalent Engagement, Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner. 
 
Watson, Adam )1992) The Evolution of Intentional Society, (London: Routledge). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 This influence is more often indirect than direct, usually via the work of Robert Cox, 1987 and 
Stephen Gill, 1993.  See also, Bieler and Morton 2001, 2003, 2004; and Rupert, 2003 
 
2 By the time George Marshall articulated the countors of the Marshall Plan in his celebrated speech at 
Harvard in 1947, George Kennan’s analysis of the nature and ambitions of the Soviet Union had 
become the accepted view of ‘virtually all the top policymakers’ (Hogan 1987: 44). For the content of 
Kennan’s highly influential ‘long telegram’, see Kennan (1997 [1947]). 
 
3 For the seminal insider’s account see, Acheson (1969). More generally, see Kunz (1997) and Latham 
(1997). 
 
4 Significantly, the predominantly bilateral disbursement of aid in the post-war period actually 
established a general pattern for the next thirty years, one that reinforced America’s position at the 
centre of a distinctive ‘hub and spokes’ security architecture that became the model for U.S. 
engagement outside Western Europe. See Milward (1984: 113-14). 
 
5 The Bretton Woods institutions were the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later replaced by the World Trade Organization) is invariably 
lumped together with them.  For an overview see Eichengreen and Kenen (1994). 
 
6 Cited in Bacevich (2002: 227). 
 
7 Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the relationship between negotiations on Free Trade 
Arrangements and support for US foreign policy.  For a detailed study see Higgott, 2004a and b.  A 
clear example of this possibility can be seen in Thailand’s crackdown on terrorism – something the 
Thai government hopes will win it a bilateral trade deal with the U.S. See, Crispin (2003). 
 
8 Higgott, (2004c) provides a detailed empirical discussion of US attitudes towards self-binding in the 
early years of both the IMF and the GATT. 
 
9 As Ian Clark recently noted, ‘we are more likely to ask questions about the legitimacy of a system 
when things appear to be going wrong’ (Clark, 2003: 75.) 
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